Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – facing many obstacles
Science
Diplomacy Fellow RIS and former Ambassador of India
A
recent online webinar by the Arms Control Association, Washington, on 17 August
brought together the advocates of the Treaty on the Prevention of Nuclear
Weapons (TPNW). The TPNW was adopted by the UN General Assembly in July 2017,
after 18 months of negotiations. The vote in the UN General Assembly was 122 in
favour, 1 against (Netherlands), and 1 official abstention (Singapore). 69
nations did not vote, among them all of the nuclear weapon states and all NATO
members except the Netherlands. The Treaty enters into force 90 days after the
50 th ratification.
On
25th October 2020, Honduras submitted the 50th instrument of accession to the
UN, enabling the formal entry into force of the Treaty. Thus an important
milestone has been crossed. Post entry into force a Conference of Parties is
proposed to will be held, with Austria offering to host. Since a large number
of States have chosen to remain outside the Treaty, including the 9 nuclear
weapons states and NATO members, it is felt that it would be useful to draw
them into the discussions as observers, and even get them to support the Treaty
in spirit if not formally.
It
was noted that the nuclear disarmament scenario had turned increasingly gloomy.
The CTBT remains far from entry into force. The FMCT negotiations are stalled.
Even well established agreements such as the bilateral INF Treaty have broken
down. The US-Russia New START Treaty expires in February 2021, its extension
depends on the US elections. Meanwhile nuclear weapons development has been
proceeding both in terms of refining the weapons and making a larger variety of
them, increasing number of warheads in the case of some countries like
Pakistan, and development of new faster and manoeuvrable delivery vehicles such
as hypersonic glide vehicles. The latter would put an end to any reasonable
prospect of anti missile defence.
Will
the pressure for the TPNW create new divisions in the already bitterly divided
NPT Review Conference? The 2020 edition of the Review has been postponed to January
2021. The supporters of the TPNW stress that the TPNW actually supports the
implementation of Article 6 of the NPT i.e. its disarmament pillar. What are
some practical aspects of the TPNW? A panellist said that it in effect would
make nuclear weapons illegal under international law, opening up possibilities
of cutting off funding and support for weapons programmes, with legal
consequences for Banks etc in states parties. It remains to be seen whether the
courts will get involved in this.
Remarkably
the discussion ignored the security dilemmas facing the 9 nuclear weapons
states, which underlie the possession of nuclear weapons. For example South
Africa, post apartheid dismantled its nuclear weapons programme. Libya was
forced to give up its nuclear programme. Kazakhstan dismantled its nuclear
weapons voluntarily. India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and China all have
underlying security perceptions that drive them to have nuclear weapons. Iran
is facing the threat of increasingly severe sanctions unless it gives up its
nuclear ambitions but is keeping its options open for security reasons. North
Korea after facing security threats over decades finally exited the NPT and
went nuclear. Therefore to treat the disease of nuclear weapons possession, one
has to treat the underlying cause of security threat perceptions. One
suggestion is to have "No First Use" agreements among the nuclear
weapons states, or even a declaration of intent, to build confidence.
India’s
position on the TPNW has been well articulated in various forums. India is
committed to universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament,
and to reach this goal through a step-by-step process underwritten by a global
and non-discriminatory multilateral framework. India has therefore supported
negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention in the Conference on
Disarmament and did not participate in the negotiations of the TPNW because of
its concerns regarding the impact of the Treaty on the existing disarmament
machinery. India is therefore not a
party to the Treaty and shall not be bound by any of the obligations that may
arise from it.
India
refuses to join the NPT which it regards as blatantly discriminatory, but
respects its principles as applicable to a nuclear weapons state. While it is
not a member of the NSG due mainly to China’s obstruction, it has secured an
exceptional regime from the NSG as a responsible nuclear weapons power. It is
for eventual complete nuclear disarmament and against horizontal proliferation.
It has stated[1]
that it remains committed to a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear
testing. It does not subscribe to any arms race, including a nuclear arms race.
It has always tempered the exercise of our strategic autonomy with a sense of
global responsibility. It affirmed its policy of no-first-use of nuclear
weapons. It faces a security threat from two nuclear armed states Pakistan and
China and has had armed conflicts with both of them.
Will
nuclear weapons go the same way as chemical and biological weapons? This can
happen if policy makers get convinced that these weapons do not achieve
military objectives and conventional forces are sufficient to assure security. The only case of use of nuclear weapons was against
Japan in August 1945, that too against non-military targets. There is
considerable evidence that Japan's decision to seek surrender was motivated by the
Soviet forces advance towards Japan, rather than nuclear weapons. As is the
case with chemical and bio weapons, the use of nuclear weapons on a scale
sufficient to destroy the enemy's hardened military targets could cause harm to
the user as well as the victim, through spread of radioactive fallout. Though
there is considerable public support for the TPNW, it faces many obstacles
before it can achieve its objectives.
[1] Statement by External Affairs Minister of India Shri Pranab
Mukherjee on the Civil Nuclear Initiative
September 05, 2008, https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18806/Statement+by+External+Affairs+Minister+of+India+Shri+Pranab+Mukherjee+on+the+Civil+Nuclear+Initiative
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